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DISLIKE: FACEBOOK’S ANTICOMPETITIVE
MONOPOLY ON SOCIAL MEDIA AND WHY
U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS MUST ADAPT TO THE
TECHNOLOGICAL ERA
Elizabeth I. Nielson
ABSTRACT
Although Facebook started as a way to connect with college classmates, it
has grown into one of the largest technology companies in the world. Facebook
is no longer solely a way to connect with classmates. Instead, it is the
powerhouse of social networks and dominates the online advertising business.
Facebook has grown at an unprecedented rate—acquiring businesses and
gathering users’ privacy along the way—partially because of the failure of U.S.
antitrust laws to adequately protect against anticompetitive and monopolistic
behavior in the technological arena.
Historically, antitrust laws have used the consumer welfare standard to
determine if entities are engaging in anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior.
However, as technology continues to develop in the twenty-first century, the way
consumer welfare is measured must be revised. This Comment outlines the
development and history of antitrust laws to illustrate how the current antitrust
model fails to adequately capture anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior in
the technological arena. Using Facebook as a case study, this Comment shows
how Big Tech harms consumers in ways not traditionally thought of—loss of
control over data and privacy, lack of innovation, and decline in business
startups—and outlines ways Congress and courts must approach U.S. antitrust
laws to better encapsulate Big Tech. These methods promote preserving the
competitive process and market structure while giving consumers a voice in the
protection of their privacy and data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a “monopoly problem,”1 and the world’s eyes are
currently focused on the four Big Tech companies: Amazon, Apple, Google, and
Facebook.2 According to an estimate from NYU economist Thomas Philippon,
“monopolies and oligopolies cost the average American household some $5,000
a year.”3 Breaking up Big Tech companies like Facebook appears to have strong
majority support among Americans.4 According to a survey conducted by Vox
and Data for Progress between January 15–19, 2021, 59% of the 1,164 people
surveyed supported breaking up Big Tech monopolies, with 24% who strongly
support doing so.5 Possible regulations of Big Tech monopolies mentioned to
the survey respondents included “undoing Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram”
and “barring Amazon from being both an online marketplace and a seller in that
marketplace.”6 Recognition of the United States’ antitrust problem is the first
step to addressing and resolving it.7 Focusing on Facebook as a case study, this
Comment will argue that U.S. antitrust laws are inadequate to regulate Big Tech
and must be reworked to protect consumers.
Part II of this Comment discusses the laws and terminology of U.S. antitrust,
gives a brief history of changes in U.S. antitrust laws leading to the twenty-first
century’s focus on technology, and explains the rationale behind U.S. antitrust
laws. Part III reviews the recent antitrust lawsuits involving the four Big Tech
companies. Part IV discusses Facebook as a case study of U.S. antitrust laws
failing to apply to Big Tech. Part V analyzes how the traditional standard for
evaluating U.S. antitrust violations does not work for measuring antitrust in the
digital age. Part VI illustrates how current U.S. antitrust laws harm consumers.
Finally, Part VII outlines ways that U.S. antitrust laws can be changed to better
protect consumers in the digital age and the future.
II. OVERVIEW OF ANTITRUST
Antitrust laws seek to control the exercise of private economic power by
monitoring monopolies and mergers and encouraging competition.8 U.S.
1. Lina Khan, The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR.
COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131, 131 (2018).
2. On October 28, 2021, Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, announced a rebranding of
“The Facebook Company” to “Meta.” Press Release, Facebook (Oct. 28, 2021),
https://about.fb.com/news/2021/10/facebook-company-is-now-meta/
[https://perma.cc/L69A3BGN]. This Comment refers to the company as Facebook.
3. Emily Stewart, America’s Monopoly Problem Stretches Far Beyond Big Tech, VOX (July
15, 2021, 12:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2021/7/15/22578388/biden-hearing-aidsexecutive-order-lina-khan [https://perma.cc/FKP6-KN2W].
4. Rani Molla, Poll: Most Americans Want to Break Up Big Tech, VOX (Jan. 26, 2021, 2:20
PM),
https://www.vox.com/2021/1/26/22241053/antitrust-google-facebook-break-up-big-techmonopoly [https://perma.cc/T3HD-3PQV].
5. Id.; see also Report with Underlying Data of Vox and Data for Progress Poll, DATA FOR
PROGRESS,
https://www.filesforprogress.org/datasets/2021/1/dfp_vox_tech_polling.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2BVT-EPPN].
6. Molla, supra note 4; see also DATA FOR PROGRESS, supra note 5.
7. Khan, supra note 1, at 131.
8. The Antitrust Laws, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

123

SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 74:120

antitrust laws historically focus on whether consumers pay more money because
a company has cornered the market. U.S. antitrust laws are focused on money,
and everything hinges on the financial responses of competitors and the
monopoly itself to determine if there is, in fact, a monopoly that is restraining
trade. This Comment argues that the way we look at monopolies in the digital
realm must change so that we can adequately regulate modern-day technology
monopolies engaging in anticompetitive conduct.
A. ORIGINS
Monopolies were illegal at common law because they imposed restrictions on
“individual freedom of contract” and caused injury to the public.9 Antitrust laws
enacted by Congress in 1890 and 1914—the Sherman Act,10 the Clayton Act,11
and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act12—reflected the “recognition that
unchecked monopoly power poses a threat to our economy and our
democracy.”13 In the 1930s, 1950s, and 1970s, Congress “reasserted this vision
through subsequent antitrust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936,
the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950, and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act of 1976.”14
B. THE SHERMAN ACT
In 1890, Congress passed the country’s first antitrust statute, the Sherman
Act.15 The Sherman Act’s primary purpose is to “enable government agencies
and private parties to enforce prohibitions against trade restraints and
monopolization.”16 The Sherman Act prohibits monopolies in order to promote
competition and to protect companies and consumers alike from unfair business
practices. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it illegal to “monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”17
Both §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act focus on stopping market control.18

antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/2VR5-7NF6].
9. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911).
10. Sherman Act, Pub. L. No. 51-647, 26 Stat. 209, 209–210 (1890) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C §§ 1–7).
11. Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, 730–740 (1914) (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
12. Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717, 717–724 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58).
13. Staff of Subcomm. on Antitrust, Com. and Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong., Investigation of Competition in Digital Markets 391 (2020) [hereinafter
Subcommittee Report]; see also Ganesh Sitaraman, Unchecked Power, New Republic (Nov. 29,
2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/152294/unchecked-power [https://perma.cc/PTD2-34FZ].
14. Subcommittee Report, supra note 13, at 391. See generally Thomas J. Horton,
Rediscovering Antitrust’s Lost Values, 16 U. N.H. L. Rev. 179 (2018) (noting the background of
various amendments to the Sherman Act).
15. 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7.
16. ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 27 (5th ed. 2004).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
18. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
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However, the Sherman Act only prohibits restraints of trade that are
“unreasonable.”19
Furthermore, the Sherman Act does not prohibit the possession of monopoly
power alone.20 Monopolies can form because of natural and encouraged
competition—in some circumstances, size is a result of a vigorous market.21
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits attempts and conspiracies to
monopolize.22 Judicial case law interpreting § 2 of the Sherman Act has focused
on the “creation” or “maintenance” of a monopoly.23 Courts focus on the
monopoly’s purpose, intent, and “drive to seize or exert monopoly power,”
rather than merely on whether a monopoly exists.24 “An unlawful monopoly
exists when one firm controls the market . . . by suppressing” and stifling
competition through anticompetitive conduct.25
C. STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY V. UNITED STATES
One of the first major cases under the Sherman Act was Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States.26 In that case, Standard Oil controlled almost 90%
of the nation’s refining capacity.27 Standard Oil forced railroads to give it
preferential rates, engaged in price discrimination, and spied on businesses to
drive local competition from the market.28 The Supreme Court of the United
States, finding for the government, provided that a “restraint of trade” referred
to a contract that made a “monopoly [or] the acts which produce the same result
as a monopoly.”29 Those consequences included higher prices, reduced output,
and reduced quality.30
This approach to § 2 of the Sherman Act established a minimum threshold for
§ 2 violations.31 This threshold was “a showing of monopoly power and of
conduct involving a restraint of trade . . . [that] demonstrated illegal purpose and
intent.”32 The Court in Standard Oil did not prohibit monopoly power on its
own; instead, the Court attempted to correct acts that created or sustained
monopoly power.33

19. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 8.
20. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 140.
21. Id.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 2.
23. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
24. Id. at 140.
25. Antitrust Laws and You, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (emphasis added),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrust-laws-and-you [https://perma.cc/SFY8-TA74] (Jan. 5, 2017).
26. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
27. Id. at 33.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 61.
30. Id. at 52.
31. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 142.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 142–43 (emphasis added).
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D. THE CLAYTON ACT AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ACT
After Standard Oil, Congress passed the Clayton34 and FTC Acts,35 which
banned price discrimination and anticompetitive mergers. The Clayton Act
allows lawsuits against companies by any person who has been “injured in his
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws,” such
as, for example, conduct that violates the Clayton Act.36 Section 7 of the Clayton
Act of 1914 prohibits any transaction where “the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”37 In
1914, Congress passed the FTC Act to create an administrative agency
responsible for antitrust enforcement.38 Congress had two primary goals in
creating the FTC. Congress sought “to ensure greater fidelity to congressional
competition policy preferences” and “improve the development and
implementation of antitrust policy.”39
The FTC Act is much more limited than prior antitrust laws. For example,
“[t]he FTC Act provides no criminal penalties and limits the FTC to obtaining
equitable relief.” Further, unlike the Clayton Act, “[n]either the Justice
Department nor private parties can enforce the FTC Act.”40 The FTC Act
empowers the FTC to:
(a) prevent unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce; (b) seek monetary redress and other
relief for conduct injurious to consumers; (c) prescribe rules defining with
specificity acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive, and establishing
requirements designed to prevent such acts or practices; (d) gather and
compile information and conduct investigations relating to the
organization, business, practices, and management of entities engaged in
commerce; and (e) make reports and legislative recommendations to
Congress and the public.41
E. MARKET POWER
Market power must be determined to assess the competitive significance of
companies in the relevant market. Without market power, a company cannot
force choices and prices on consumers or competitors.42 A company with market
power can charge more than its rivals or it can sell for less than the “market
price” in order to undercut its rivals.43 Defining the relevant market and

34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27.
35. Id. §§ 41–58.
36. Id. § 15(a); The Antitrust Laws, supra note 8.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
38. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 35.
39. Id. at 37.
40. Id.
41. Summary
of
the
Federal
Trade
Commission
Act,
FTC,
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act [https://perma.cc/GD7TLF4D].
42. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 112.
43. Id.

COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2022]

Dislike

126

determining a company’s power within that market are essential in Sherman Act
cases and challenges to mergers, usually under § 7 of the Clayton Act.44
F. CHANGES IN DOCTRINE BETWEEN 1960 AND 1980
1. The Harvard School
By the 1960s and 1970s, the courts and government agencies responsible for
antitrust enforcement had adopted an economic theory developed by “a group of
Harvard scholars who assumed that firms with market power would act in an
anticompetitive manner.”45 These scholars argued that market concentration
makes it more likely that companies will engage in anticompetitive conduct.46
As such, these scholars disapproved of market concentration regardless of
whether the conduct had a potential to benefit consumers by lowering prices and
increasing output.47 The key factor under this approach was the market share
held by a firm. Under the Harvard School approach, courts and government
agencies should act to prevent companies with market power from engaging in
conduct that was otherwise permissible for companies without market power.48
2. The Chicago School
While the Harvard School approach made antitrust trial outcomes predictable,
the Chicago School approach “revolutionized the antitrust field in the 1970s and
1980s.”49 The central focus of the Chicago School approach to antitrust is the
concept of consumer welfare and was heavily influenced by a 1978 book by the
late Judge Robert Bork.50 Judge Bork argued that consumer welfare means
“lower costs, reduced prices, and increased output of products and services
desired by consumers.”51 Judge Bork believed that “[t]he only legitimate goal of
American antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare.”52 “All other
possible goals of antitrust laws” were not important.53 In other words, Judge
Bork believed that companies should be free to collude as long as their
anticompetitive behavior does not lead to higher prices for consumers.
The narrow focus on the welfare of the consumer alone has led courts and
government agencies responsible for antitrust enforcement to worry mainly
about “efficiency” in the markets, believing that greater efficiency will lower

44. Id. at 113.
45. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Harvard and Chicago Schools: A New Antitrust
Approach for the 21st Century, 82 IND. L.J. 345, 346 (2007).
46. Id. at 349.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 350.
49. Ianni Drivas, Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH.
(June 4, 2019), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/reassessing-chicago-school-antitrust-law
[https://perma.cc/7NDR-P9Q5].
50. Id.
51. Piraino, supra note 45, at 350 (citing Robert H. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of
the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7 (1966)).
52. Bork, supra note 51, at 7.
53. Id. at 7 n.1.
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prices for consumers.54 This focus has blinded enforcers to other harms caused
by market concentration and “undue market power, including on workers,
suppliers, innovators, and independent entrepreneurs,” such as a lack of control
over personal data, a loss of privacy, and a dearth of innovation and business
startups.55
Several proponents of the Chicago School approach—such as Judges Bork,
Posner, and Easterbrook—brought the theory with them when they moved to the
federal bench.56 As such, the Chicago School approach to antitrust became the
dominant legal theory and appears to be the prevailing theory in antitrust laws
today.57
3. Judge Bork’s The Antitrust Paradox
In 1978, Judge Bork published The Antitrust Paradox, arguing that the tough
antitrust policy of the time stood in the way of economic efficiency.58 He insisted
that the Sherman Act should focus on consumer welfare through price.59 Judge
Bork defined consumer welfare as total welfare, and the Supreme Court soon
adopted Judge Bork’s approach in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.60
4. United States v. Microsoft Corp.
One of the biggest, if not the biggest, technology antitrust court cases to date
is United States v. Microsoft Corp.61 In the 1980s, Microsoft was one of the most
successful software companies in the world.62 However, on May 18, 1998, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the attorneys general of multiple states filed
antitrust charges against Microsoft.63 One key issue in the case was whether
Microsoft’s bundling of software with its operating system was monopolistic.64
The Government accused Microsoft of making it difficult to install software that
would compete with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer—namely Netscape
Navigator.65 After a failed attempt at mediated settlement, U.S. District Court
Judge Jackson ordered Microsoft to break into two companies—an operating
systems company and an applications company.66

54. Khan, supra note 1, at 132.
55. Id.
56. Piraino, supra note 45, at 351.
57. See Khan, supra note 1, at 132.
58. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 405
(1978).
59. Id.
60. See 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (agreeing with Judge Bork’s discussion of purposes of the
Sherman Act). For a brief discussion of Judge Bork’s notion of total welfare, see Lina M. Khan,
Note, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 720 n.38 (2017).
61. 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
62. See Eric Reed, History of Microsoft: Timeline and Facts, THESTREET (Sept. 2, 2019, 1:21
AM),
https://www.thestreet.com/technology/history-of-microsoft-15073246
[https://perma.cc/XD85-5F9U].
63. Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 47.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 48.
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Microsoft appealed.67 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld only one of
the district court’s three findings.68 The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s finding that Microsoft was illegally bundling the Microsoft Windows
operating system and the Internet Explorer software.69 The court of appeals also
reversed the district court’s finding that Microsoft had engaged in an illegal
attempt to monopolize a browser market because the government failed “(1) to
define the relevant market and (2) to demonstrate that substantial barriers to
entry protect that market.”70
The court of appeals affirmed in part the district court’s holding “that
Microsoft [had] violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by employing anticompetitive
means to maintain a monopoly in the operating system market.”71 The court of
appeals distilled the core of antitrust laws at the time, stating that “[t]he
challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for distinguishing
between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and competitive acts,
which increase it.”72
Microsoft and the DOJ eventually settled after the DOJ dropped the demand
that Microsoft split into two companies, and Microsoft agreed to share its
interface with other companies (like Netscape).73 However, Microsoft set the
stage for antitrust litigation and technology early in the twenty-first century, and
it continues to be one of the most influential cases in antitrust litigation.
G. RATIONALE
Congress intentionally drafted the antitrust statutes broadly.74 Crucial terms
in the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts are not defined within the Acts.75 Rather,
current U.S. antitrust laws “proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices
in general terms, leaving courts to decide which ones are illegal based on the
facts of each case.”76 The statutes invite periodic refinement as we gain greater
understandings of their applicability in time.77 This structure gives the antitrust
laws the flexibility to adjust and adapt to an evolving world.78 Whether or not
Congress uses this flexibility to regulate technology companies engaging in
anticompetitive behavior is up for debate; yet, as this Comment will show,
Congress’s failure to update U.S. antitrust laws to respond to the novel ways in
which technology companies have engaged in anticompetitive behavior has
67. Id. at 45.
68. Id. at 46.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 81.
71. Id. at 46.
72. Id. at 58.
73. Andrew Beattie, Why Did Microsoft Face Antitrust Charges in 1998?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/microsoft-antitrust.asp [https://perma.cc/VDE5Q7F6] (Oct. 25, 2021).
74. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 39.
75. Id.
76. The Antitrust Laws, supra note 8.
77. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 39.
78. Id.
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created a slew of problems.
III. RECENT ANTITRUST LITIGATION
The Big Tech companies—Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook—each
play an important role in our economy and society as the underlying
infrastructure for exchanging communications, information, goods, and
services. The massive prominence of just these four companies is reflected in
their market capitalization. As of October 25, 2021, the combined valuation of
these companies is approximately $7.17 trillion—approximately 18.35% of the
total market capitalization of the S&P 500 (approximately $39.06 trillion).79
Amazon, Apple, Google, and Facebook have purchased more than 500
companies since 1998.80 As if to illustrate the lack of antitrust enforcement
against these companies in the past, U.S. antitrust agencies did not block a single
one of those acquisitions.81 However, the tide may be turning. Over the last
several years, Big Tech has been involved in a flurry of antitrust litigation that
has not been seen since Microsoft.82 What the United States needs now is a
modern update of its antitrust laws to give the courts and government agencies
the tools to protect consumers and businesses alike from anticompetitive
practices.
A. PRIMED FOR AMAZON
Amazon is estimated to be among the largest private employers in the United
States, with over 500,000 employees—second only to Walmart.83 Amazon
“operates across a wide range of direct-to-consumer and business-to-business
markets, including e-commerce, consumer electronics, television and film
production, groceries, cloud services, book publishing, and logistics.”84
With such large success have belatedly come questions regarding Amazon’s
methods to attain it. To wit, European Union (E.U.) regulators filed an antitrust
lawsuit against Amazon on November 10, 2020, accusing Amazon of using
“data from companies that sell products on its platform to gain an unfair
advantage over them.”85 The E.U.’s investigation found that Amazon was, and
79. See Iman Ghosh, Which Companies Belong to the Elite Trillion-Dollar Club?, VISUAL
CAPITALIST (Aug. 23, 2021), https://www.visualcapitalist.com/which-companies-belong-to-theelite-trillion-dollar-club/ [https://perma.cc/MS4G-KHGZ]; S&P 500 Market Cap, YCHARTS (Oct.
31, 2021), https://ycharts.com/indicators/sp_500_market_cap [https://perma.cc/D9E5-4X2S].
80. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 392, 406–50.
81. Id. at 387 (“Although the dominant platforms collectively engaged in several hundred
mergers and acquisitions between 2000-2019, antitrust enforcers did not block a single one of these
transactions.”).
82. See infra Sections III.A–D.
83. Charles Duhigg, Is Amazon Unstoppable?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/10/21/is-amazon-unstoppable
[https://perma.cc/JSC3-WASF]; Press Release, Amazon, Amazon.com Announces Second Quarter
Results (July 30, 2020), https://s2.q4cdn.com/299287126/files/doc_financials/2020/q2/Q2-2020Amazon-Earnings-Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y74Y-J2VE].
84. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 247.
85. EU Charges Amazon in Antitrust Lawsuit, Alleges Unfair Competition, CBC News (Nov.
10, 2020, 12:14 PM), https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/amazon-eu-antitrust-1.5796672
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presumably still is, accessing real-time data from competitors that sell products
on its platform to determine which goods to sell, how to price these goods, and
how to market them.86 Since E.U. regulators have no deadlines for bringing the
case to an end, the litigation could go on for some time before a final decision is
made.87
Meanwhile, in the United States, a class action lawsuit was filed against
Amazon for antitrust violations on January 14, 2021, in the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York.88 The complaint alleges that Amazon and
publishers entered into price-fixing agreements in 2015, allowing publishers to
increase their e-book prices by 30%.89 The complaint further alleges that
Amazon controlled approximately 90% of the e-book market in 2018 and used
that incredibly high level of control to increase prices for customers.90 With its
continued growth, these cases are likely to be only the beginning of antitrust
cases brought against Amazon.
B. THE BIG APPLE
Apple is the leading smartphone vendor in the United States, accounting for
approximately 53% of the domestic market in Q2 2021, with more than 113
million iPhone users in the United States.91 Apple’s iOS operating system is one
of the two dominant mobile operating systems in the United States, running on
44.3% of U.S. mobile devices.92 Apple sold its two billionth iOS device in
201893 and its two billionth iPhone in 2021.94
Like Amazon, the methods of Apple’s success have recently, and finally,
come under antitrust scrutiny. In response to the 30% cut of all sales of apps
[https://perma.cc/Z95U-L3YC].
86. Id.
87. Id. Amazon is engaged in preliminary discussions with the E.U. regulators and has offered
concessions to address their concerns, but Settlement talks can take months to wrap up, with no
guarantee that both sides will reach an agreement. Foo Yun Chee, Amazon Seeking to Settle EU
Antitrust Investigations, Sources Say, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/business/retailconsumer/exclusive-amazon-seeking-settle-eu-antitrust-investigations-sources-say-2021-11-09/
[https://perma.cc/MAZ4-Q9WS].
88. Class Action Complaint at 1, Fremgen v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:21-cv-351 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 14, 2021).
89. Id. at 3, 5–6.
90. Id. at 10–11.
91. See Team Counterpoint, US Smartphone Market Share: By Quarter, COUNTERPOINT,
https://www.counterpointresearch.com/us-market-smartphone-share
[https://perma.cc/L4SS2VE7] (Aug. 16, 2021); S. O’Dea, IPhone Users as Share of Smartphone Users in the United States
2014-2021, STATISTA (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/236550/percentage-ofus-population-that-own-a-iphone-smartphone [https://perma.cc/VUW6-TGAH].
92. See Bridget Poetker, The Mobile Operating Systems That Matter Right Now (+Effects on
Development),
G2 (May 21,
2021),
https://learn.g2.com/mobile-operating-systems
[https://perma.cc/2TLW-WYUF].
93. Malcolm Owen, How Apple Has Hit 2 Billion iOS Devices Sold, and When It Will Hit 2
Billion iPhones, APPLEINSIDER (Sept. 13, 2018), https://appleinsider.com/articles/18/09/13/howapple-has-hit-2-billion-ios-devices-sold-and-when-it-will-hit-2-billion-iphones
[https://perma.cc/2LLN-5JTB].
94. Ben Lovejoy, Apple Sells Its 2-billionth iPhone, with Steve Jobs Legacy Still Evident,
9TO5MAC (Sept. 22, 2021, 4:40 AM), https://9to5mac.com/2021/09/22/steve-jobs-legacy-iphone13/ [https://perma.cc/D5MJ-V3XX].
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through the App Store that Apple required of third-party app developers, Epic
Games, a video game and software developer and publisher, gave users the
option to pay for its popular video game, Fortnite, through Epic Games itself,
instead of going through the App Store—a violation of Apple’s guidelines for
the App Store.95 This option removed the 30% transaction fee that Apple charges
for every purchase through the App Store.96 Unsurprisingly, Apple removed
Fortnite from the App Store later on the same day.97 In response to Apple’s
actions, Epic Games filed suit against Apple in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California.98 In a motion for preliminary injunction, Epic
Games asked the court “to force Apple to reinstate Fortnite to the Apple App
Store . . . and to stop Apple from terminating its affiliates’ access to developer
tools for other applications . . . while Epic Games litigates its claims.”99 The
district court granted in part and denied in part the motion, stating that Apple is
preliminarily enjoined “from taking adverse action against the Epic Affiliates
with respect to restricting, suspending or terminating the Epic Affiliates from
the Apple’s Developer Program” but that Apple would not be required to
immediately bring Fortnite back onto the App Store.100 A trial on the merits
concluded in May 2021,101 and the court issued its final ruling on September 10,
2021, with a split decision for the parties.102 The court concluded on the one
hand that Epic Games failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Apple is
an illegal monopolist but on the other hand Apple engaged in anticompetitive
conduct under California’s competition laws by forcing people to pay for apps
and in-app items through the App Store.103 As of the date of this Comment,
Apple intends to appeal the ruling to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.104
C. GOOGLE’S EARTH
Google has become synonymous with its search engine, Google Search. The

95. Hirun Cryer, Here’s Everything We Know About the Epic Vs Apple Lawsuit,
GAMESRADAR+ (Sept. 11, 2021), https://www.gamesradar.com/epic-vs-apple-lawsuit
[https://perma.cc/F665-QUBR].
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 493 F. Supp. 3d 817, 826 (N.D. Cal. 2020).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 853; see also Russell Brandom, Sean Hollister & Jay Peters, Epic Judge Will Protect
Unreal
Engine—but
Not
Fortnite,
VERGE
(Aug.
25,
2020,
9:44
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/25/21400240/epic-apple-ruling-unreal-engine-fortnitetemporary-restraining-order [https://perma.cc/2ETB-GNTR].
101. Dan Patterson, What We Learned from the Epic Games v. Apple Lawsuit, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/epic-apple-lawsuit-what-we-learned
[https://perma.cc/SA2GGM2Z] (May 27, 2021, 10:08 AM).
102. Epic Games, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 4:20-CV-05640, 2021 WL 4128925 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
10,
2021),
https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/21060696/epic-v-apple-ruling.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DMW3-6J9U].
103. Id.
104. Adi Robertson, Judge Orders Apple to Allow External Payment Options for App Store by
December
9th,
Denying
Stay,
VERGE
(Nov
9,
2021,
8:14
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/11/9/22773082/epic-apple-fortnite-lawsuit-ruling-injunctionstay-app-store-anti-steering-rules [https://perma.cc/WRU5-UEH8].
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company is now also a web browser, a mobile operating system, the largest
digital advertising provider, and “a major provider of digital mapping, email,
cloud computing, and voice assistant services.”105 Nine of Google’s products—
Android, Chrome, Gmail, Search, Drive, Maps, Photos, Play Store, and
YouTube—each have more than a billion users.106 These products provide
Google with “a trove of user data,” which it has used to “reinforc[e] its
dominance across markets” and increase its revenues through online ads.107 In
several markets, Google built its stature through acquisitions rather than, for
example, research and development of new products or services.108 In the last
twenty years, Google has purchased at least 260 companies.109
Both Google’s advertising and its search engine methods have recently come
under fire. On August 13, 2020, mirroring its lawsuit against Apple, Epic Games
filed suit against Google for alleged anticompetitive behavior in the Google Play
Store in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California.110 Epic
alleges Google violated both the Sherman and California Cartwright Acts.111
Like Apple, Google collects transaction fees of 30% for all in-app purchases.112
Epic updated Fortnite so that Android users could submit payments directly to
Epic Games rather than going through the Google Play Store—again, as was the
case with Apple’s guidelines, this was a direct violation of Google’s Google Play
Store guidelines.113 And like Apple, Google removed Fortnite from the Google
Play Store.114 For Fortnite customers, this means they can continue playing the
current version but will be unable to download any future versions or updates.115
Epic argues that if direct payments were allowed, then Epic would be able to
pass on savings to its customers.116 Although, on the surface, the cases between
both Apple and Google appear similar, Google continues to argue that its case
is different from Apple’s and does not want the judge to merge the two.117 As of
December 2021, the case is still pending.118
105. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 174.
106. Id. (citing Harry McCracken, How Google Photos Joined the Billion-User Club, FAST
CO. (July 24, 2019), https://www.fastcompany.com/90380618/how-google-photos-joined-thebillion-user-club [https://perma.cc/3TJD-MTUK]).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. Russell Brandom, Epic Is Suing Google over Fortnite’s Removal from the Google Play
Store, VERGE (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:51 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/8/13/21368363/epicgoogle-fortnite-lawsuit-antitrust-app-play-store-apple-removal [https://perma.cc/5S84-CAJ7].
111. Id.
112. Samit Sarkar, Epic Games’ Fortnite Legal Battle with Apple and Google, Explained,
POLYGON,
https://www.polygon.com/2020/8/17/21372119/fortnite-apple-google-sued-epicgames-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/K9N2-T6EU] (Aug. 25, 2020, 5:54 PM).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Chantal Allam, Google Is Pushing to Get Epic’s Fortnite Antitrust Case Dismissed,
WRAL TECHWIRE (Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.wraltechwire.com/2020/09/04/google-is-pushingto-get-epics-fortnite-antitrust-case-dismissed [https://perma.cc/LE49-TN8M].
118. Jennifer Elias, Analysts Explain How the Apple-Epic Court Ruling Could Affect Google,
CNBC (Sept. 13, 2021, 8:57 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2021/09/13/how-the-apple-epic-court-
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As for government enforcement, the DOJ, along with eleven state attorneys
general, filed an antitrust lawsuit against Google on October 20, 2020, in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia “to stop Google from unlawfully
maintaining monopolies through anticompetitive and exclusionary practices in
the search and search advertising markets and to remedy the competitive
harms.”119 In a press release, the DOJ stated that the government is “enforcing
the Sherman Act to restore the role of competition and open the door to the next
wave of innovation—this time in vital digital markets.”120 The DOJ alleges, “By
suppressing competition in advertising, Google has the power to charge
advertisers more than it could in a competitive market and to reduce the quality
of the services it provides them.”121 Google responded to the lawsuit with a blog
post stating that the lawsuit “suggests we shouldn’t have worked to make Search
better and that we should, in fact, be less useful to you.”122 Since this case was
filed, two more antitrust cases have been brought against Google—one by
attorneys general in thirty-five states and another filed by Texas’s Attorney
General, Ken Paxton, along with nine other state attorneys general.123
D. FACEBOOK’S MARKETPLACE
Facebook is one of the largest personal social networking platforms and has
immense power in personal social networking services. Facebook’s business
operates around five primary product offerings: “(1) Facebook, a social network
platform; (2) Instagram, a social network app for photos and videos; (3)
Messenger, a cross-platform messaging app for Facebook users; (4) WhatsApp,
a cross-platform messaging app; and (5) Oculus, a virtual reality gaming
system.”124 Over 3 billion people regularly use Facebook itself,125 with over 1.79
billion daily active users, 2.91 billion monthly active users, and an average
revenue of $10.00 per user in Q3 2021.126 As of September 2021, Facebook’s
family of products engaged 2.81 billion people daily, engaged 3.58 billion

ruling-could-affect-google-analysts.html [https://perma.cc/8GJF-PGHJ].
119. Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Affs., Justice Department Sues Monopolist
Google For Violating Antitrust Laws (Oct. 20, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws [https://perma.cc/2C3M-KWK7].
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Adam Cohen, Redesigning Search Would Harm American Consumers and Businesses,
GOOGLE: THE KEYWORD (Dec. 17, 2020), https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/publicpolicy/redesigning-search-would-harm-consumers-and-american-businesses
[https://perma.cc/EBG5-YNJ9].
123. Rani Molla & Adam Clark Estes, Google’s Three Antitrust Cases, Briefly Explained,
VOX,
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/12/16/22179085/google-antitrust-monopoly-statelawsuit-ad-tech-search-facebook [https://perma.cc/TF9M-QP83] (Dec 17, 2020, 2:42 PM).
124. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 132.
125. Complaint for Injunctive & Other Equitable Relief at 1, FTC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:20cv-03590 (D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2021) [hereinafter FTC Complaint]; see also Our Mission, FACEBOOK,
https://about.fb.com/company-info [https://perma.cc/Y4F3-8LU6] (“Our products empower more
than 3 billion people around the world to share ideas, offer support and make a difference.”).
126. Facebook, Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) 28, 33 (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1326801/000132680121000065/fb-20210930.htm
[https://perma.cc/4KCT-CXXA].
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people monthly, and generated an average revenue of $8.18 per user of one or
more of their products.127
As measured by monthly active users, Facebook owns three of the seven most
popular mobile apps in the United States.128 No other personal social network of
comparable scale exists anywhere in the world.129 Because of its market power,
several international antitrust enforcement agencies have scrutinized Facebook
in recent years. For example, in July 2020, the United Kingdom’s Competition
and Markets Authority found that Facebook’s market power “derives in large
part from strong network effects stemming from its large network of connected
users and the limited interoperability it allows to other social media
platforms.”130
“Facebook monetizes its personal social networking monopoly principally by
selling advertising, which exploits a rich set of data about users’ activities,
interests, and affiliations to target advertisements to users.”131 Facebook, in
combination with Google, comprised almost 61% of the total digital advertising
spending in 2019.132 That same year, Facebook generated more than $70 billion
in revenue and $18.5 billion in profits.133
Facebook has maintained its dominant position (both in terms of numbers of
users and revenue) by buying up companies that could present competitive
threats, like Instagram and WhatsApp.134 According to the FTC,
Facebook has engaged in a systematic strategy—including its 2012
acquisition of up-and-coming rival Instagram, its 2014 acquisition of the
mobile messaging app WhatsApp, and the imposition of anticompetitive
conditions on software developers—to eliminate threats to its monopoly.
This course of conduct harms competition, leaves consumers with few
choices for personal social networking, and deprives advertisers of the
127. See id. at 27, 35.
128. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 136 (citations omitted).
129. Press Release, FTC, FTC Sues Facebook for Illegal Monopolization (Dec. 9, 2020),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/12/ftc-sues-facebook-illegalmonopolization [https://perma.cc/FRV6-5WTA].
130. COMPETITION & MKTS. AUTH., ONLINE PLATFORMS AND DIGITAL ADVERTISING:
MARKET
STUDY
FINAL
REPORT
26
(2020),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5efc57ed3a6f4023d242ed56/Final_report_1_July_
2020_.pdf [https://perma.cc/YA8B-F6TK].
131. FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 2.
132. Nicole Perrin, Facebook-Google Duopoly Won’t Crack This Year, EMARKETER (Nov. 4,
2019),
https://www.emarketer.com/content/facebook-google-duopoly-won-t-crack-this-year
[https://perma.cc/7PYL-VG8A]. For yet another reflection of the monopolistic market power of the
Big Tech companies, see Daisuke Wakabayashi & Tiffany Hsu, Behind a Secret Deal Between
Google and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/17/technology/googlefacebook-ad-deal-antitrust.html [https://perma.cc/V94K-UEUF] (Apr. 6, 2021) (“In 2017,
Facebook said it was testing a new way of selling online advertising that would threaten Google’s
control of the digital ad market. But . . . [by 2019, it had] join[ed] an alliance of companies backing
a similar effort by Google. Facebook never said why it pulled back from its project, but evidence
presented in an antitrust lawsuit filed by 10 state attorneys general [in December 2020] indicates
that Google had extended to Facebook, its closest rival for digital advertising dollars, a sweetheart
deal to be a partner.”).
133. FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 2.
134. Id. at 1–2.
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benefits of competition.135
This strategy echoes CEO Mark Zuckerberg’s view articulated in a June 2008
internal email provided to the FTC during its investigation into Facebook that
“it is better to buy than compete.”136 This mode of thinking has pervaded Big
Tech and will inevitably harm consumers and dampen innovation.
IV. FACEBOOK AS A CASE STUDY
Market share is usually measured by sales, but this concept presents
difficulties when applied to Big Tech companies because they often do not
directly charge consumers.137 However, even though Facebook is “free” in the
dollars-and-cents understanding of the word, consumers “pay” to use Facebook
with data and attention.138 “In digital markets where consumers do not pay a
price, antitrust enforcement must become comfortable with a paradigm that
focuses on quality.”139
A. FACEBOOK V. MYSPACE
Launched in 2003, MySpace was one of the early personal social networks.
MySpace did not restrict membership in its network, allowed users to
customize their pages and to make them public, and continuously added
features based on user demand. By the time The Facebook launched at
Harvard University in February 2004, MySpace had more than a million
users and was becoming America’s dominant social network.140
In 2006, MySpace reached 100 million users and surpassed Google as the
most visited website in the United States.141 But it also started to run into serious
problems. For instance, MySpace was known for having an open platform and a
lack of privacy that garnered negative attention.142
135. FTC, supra note 129.
136. FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 2, 4, 21.
137. Pedro Aranguez-Diaz, Comment, A New Opportunity for Digital Competition: Facebook,
Libra, and Antitrust, 50 STETSON L. REV. 199, 210 (2020).
138. Id. at 211 (citing Tim Wu, Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 771, 771 (2019)).
139. Dina Srinivasan, The Antitrust Case Against Facebook: A Monopolist’s Journey Towards
Pervasive Surveillance in Spite of Consumers’ Preference for Privacy, 16 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 39,
46 (2019).
140. Gil Press, Why Facebook Triumphed Over All Other Social Networks, FORBES (Apr. 8,
2018, 4:11 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2018/04/08/why-facebook-triumphedover-all-other-social-networks/?sh=49b0dad66e91 [https://perma.cc/GHS2-H6LD].
141. Srinivasan, supra note 139, at 46 (citing Hanging with the In-Crowd, ECONOMIST (Sept.
14, 2006), https://www.economist.com/node/7918729 [https://perma.cc/EF3P-94PC]).
142. See, e.g., Sue Downes, Teens Who Tell Too Much, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2006),
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/15/opinion/nyregionopinions/teens-who-tell-too-much.html
[https://perma.cc/42QL-3CGW]; John Kreiser, MySpace: Your Kids’ Danger?, CBS NEWS (Feb.
6,
2006,
6:17
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/myspace-your-kids-danger
[https://perma.cc/MN5E-YR4C]; Jane Gordon, MySpace Draws a Questionable Crowd, N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
26,
2006),
https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/26/nyregion/nyregionspecial2/myspace-draws-a-questionable-
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Enter Facebook. MySpace was already a free platform, so Facebook needed
to provide something different to entice users to move from MySpace to
Facebook. Among other things, Facebook marketed itself as a privacy-focused
alternative to MySpace.143
When Facebook entered the market, it stood apart because of its privacy
protection. Facebook’s privacy policy stated that “[w]e do not and will not use
cookies to collect private information from any user.”144 Facebook initially
allowed users to opt out of sharing information with third parties such as
advertisers.145 However, the concerns over protecting users’ privacy did not last.
On November 6, 2007, Facebook released “Beacon,” an advertising product,
which allowed Facebook to record and monitor its users’ activity outside of
Facebook.146 Facebook eventually discontinued Beacon, but its premise
remained.147 Facebook surveillance today is a mandatory requirement for a
third-party’s use of other Facebook products.148 In April 2008, Facebook
surpassed MySpace in the number of unique worldwide visitors, and in May
2009, in the number of unique U.S. visitors.149
B. ACQUIRING INSTAGRAM AND WHATSAPP
The FTC recently brought an antitrust lawsuit against Facebook, alleging that
Facebook “illegally maintain[ed] its personal social networking monopoly
through a years-long course of anticompetitive conduct” and that Facebook’s
“course of conduct harms competition, leaves consumers with few choices for
personal social networking, and deprives advertisers of the benefits of
competition.”150 Two key aspects of Facebook’s growth that the FTC’s
complaint focused on were its acquisitions of both Instagram and WhatsApp.
1. Instagram
According to the FTC’s complaint filed against Facebook, Instagram
“emerged at a critical time of technological and social transition, when users of
personal social networking were migrating from desktop computers to

crowd.html [https://perma.cc/E3LN-ZX52]; Anna Bahney, Don’t Talk to Invisible Strangers, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 9, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/09/fashion/thursdaystyles/dont-talk-toinvisible-strangers.html [https://perma.cc/D5CU-YAA7]; Tom Rawstorne, How Paedophiles Prey
on MySpace Children, DAILYMAIL.COM, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-397026/Howpaedophiles-prey-MySpace-children.html [https://perma.cc/3VEJ-D9UZ] (July 21, 2006, 10:40
PM); Wired Staff, Myspace Murder: An Epilogue, WIRED (Nov. 17, 2006, 12:00 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2006/11/myspace-murder-an-epilogue [https://perma.cc/MD9L-V4G6].
143. Srinivasan, supra note 139, at 48.
144. Facebook
Privacy
Policy,
FACEBOOK
(2004),
https://web.archive.org/web/20050107221705/http:/www.thefacebook.com/policy.php
[https://perma.cc/54LR-XA2M].
145. Srinivasan, supra note 139, at 51.
146. Id. at 56.
147. See id. at 60–62.
148. Id. at 62.
149. Press, supra note 140.
150. FTC, supra note 129.
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smartphones and toward a greater use of photo-based sharing.”151 During its
investigation into Facebook, the FTC revealed documents indicating that
Facebook knew it was “acquir[ing] Instagram to neutralize an emerging
rival.”152 Because Instagram met the demand for social networking on
smartphones, it became a clear threat to Facebook’s long-established social
media monopoly,153 and Facebook had a “buy or bury” strategy whenever there
was a competitive threat.154 Instagram appeared to be a step ahead of Facebook
in moving from desktop computers to smartphones. The biggest risk to Facebook
was, and still is, that some other “new thing” will come along and take attention
away from Facebook—Instagram was threatening to become that new thing
before Facebook acquired it.155
Internal Facebook emails predating the Instagram deal discussed how
cameras were the next new thing.156 When Apple released the iPhone 4 with a
front-facing camera in the early 2010s, it was a sign that social media was going
to involve far more smartphones than desktops.157 Facebook was “not wellpositioned for mobile” adaptability at the time,158 so it “identified a market . . .
[and] a need.”159 Facebook knew that it would have had a hard time competing
in the mobile space if it did not acquire or work with Instagram.160
Emails between Mark Zuckerberg and the head of Instagram illustrate how
Facebook threatened Instagram.161 Zuckerberg stated that Instagram needed to
figure out how it would manage the relationship between the two platforms to
help decide whether the two companies would be partners or competitors.162
Regulators rightly read those emails as a threat.163 As Zuckerberg explained in
an email to Facebook’s CFO David Ebersman, “controlling Instagram would
secure Facebook’s enduring dominance” by significantly hindering another firm
from using photo-sharing on mobile phones as a way to gain popularity as a
provider of personal social networking:
Even if some new competitors spring[] up, buying Instagram, Path,
Foursquare, etc. now will give us a year or more to integrate their dynamics
before anyone can get close to their scale again. Within that time, if we
incorporate the social mechanics they were using, those new products
151. FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 4.
152. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 392.
153. See id. at 151–52.
154. The Weeds, The Next Four Years: Fighting Tech Monopolies, VOX, at 35:54 (Jan. 15,
2021), https://open.spotify.com/episode/0oyxOAdjI1SF9BkVnnsNb7?si [https://perma.cc/E7G7H77X] (downloaded using Spotify).
155. Id. at 36:57.
156. What Next: TBD, Everybody Sues Facebook, SLATE, at 6:50 (Dec. 11, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://slate.com/podcasts/what-next-tbd/2020/12/the-battle-to-break-up-facebook
[https://perma.cc/Y9AM-N5SW].
157. Id. at 7:45.
158. Id. at 8:18.
159. Id. at 9:53.
160. See id. at 10:03.
161. Id. at 10:29.
162. Id. at 10:44.
163. See id.
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won’t get much traction since we’ll already have their mechanics deployed
at scale.164
Read in conjunction with Facebook’s internal emails, which also included
suggestions to “pay[] a lot of money” for Instagram and concerns that Facebook
would be “very behind in both functionality and brand on how one of the core
use cases of Facebook will evolve in the mobile world,”165 it is plain to see that
Facebook’s only goal in acquiring Instagram was to neutralize a competitor and
protect its dominant market power. Facebook’s Instagram acquisition gave it
control over its biggest and most important competitor, securing Facebook’s
position as the largest personal social media company in the world with no signs
of losing that status anywhere in sight.166 If the current U.S. antitrust regime is
not sufficient to stop such an acquisition, then it is clearly not up to the task of
protecting consumers and businesses from monopolies.
2. WhatsApp
The other market that Facebook was unprepared to compete in was mobile
messaging. Messaging was the next frontier in social networking in the early
2010s, and it was not something Facebook was good at.167 By 2012, the threat
of a mobile messaging app with social network capabilities running on multiple
operating systems became “a strategic focus for [Facebook’s] leadership.”168 In
an April 2012 email produced to the FTC during its investigation, “Zuckerberg
identified a troubling global trend of ‘messaging apps . . . using messages as a
springboard to build more general mobile social networks.’ And by October
2012, the threat was [apparently] widely recognized within Facebook, with a
Facebook business growth director predicting internally that ‘[t]his might be the
biggest threat we’ve ever faced as a company.’”169 Facebook considered an app
offering mobile messaging services entering the personal social networking
market to be “the next biggest consumer risk” for Facebook.170 It identified
WhatsApp, a popular mobile messaging app, to be the most significant such
threat.171 In an August 2013 email produced to the FTC during its investigation,
“the head of Facebook’s internal mergers and acquisitions . . . group warned that
WhatsApp’s ‘kind of mobile messaging is a wedge into broader social
activity/sharing on mobile we have historically led in web.’”172 So, as it did with
Instagram, Facebook acquired WhatsApp instead of trying to outcompete it.173
And just as was the case with Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram, our current
antitrust regime proved to be not up to the task of stopping another monopolistic

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 5.
Id. at 4–5.
See id. at 4–6.
What Next: TBD, supra note 156, at 7:12.
FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 6.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id.
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acquisition by a Big Tech giant of a growing competitive threat.
C. BEHAVIOR AS ANTICOMPETITIVE
In U.S. antitrust laws, “intent matters.”174 The courts have to look at why
Facebook acquired Instagram and WhatsApp in order to determine if there was
anticompetitive conduct or intent to obtain a monopoly in the market.175
Facebook bought Instagram and WhatsApp because it was afraid of those two
companies taking business from and outcompeting Facebook.176 As such,
Facebook’s acquisitions should have been blocked as illegal, anticompetitive
conduct under U.S. antitrust laws.177 Current U.S. antitrust laws are supposed to
protect choice and consumer welfare, yet these acquisitions reduced consumer
choice.178 However, because of the importance of the consumer welfare standard
in current U.S. antitrust laws and because of the way consumer welfare is
measured, current U.S. antitrust laws fail to adequately restrain anticompetitive
conduct by Big Tech. It begs the question that if U.S. authorities had not allowed
Facebook to acquire Instagram and WhatsApp in the first place, “would there be
more benefits to consumers?”179
V. THE CONSUMER WELFARE STANDARD AND ITS FAILURE TO
APPLY TO BIG TECH
The Sherman Act provides courts and agencies with little guidance in
deciding when a company acts as a monopoly for antitrust purposes.180
Nonetheless, defining the relevant market and evaluating a company’s power
within the relevant market are critical steps in cases involving the Sherman Act
and challenges to mergers often brought under § 7 of the Clayton Act.181
There are three different approaches “used to measure market power:
performance, rivalry, and structure.”182 However, most of the time, these three
tests are inapplicable to Big Tech because of how the tests work. Each test
measures sales, output, and price difference among competitors, none of which
adequately capture the effects of the anticompetitive conduct we’ve seen from
Big Tech.183 Measuring market power is an inexact process.184 When coupled
174. Planet Money, The Case Against Facebook, NPR, at 5:46 (Dec. 16, 2020, 8:21 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/16/947160910/the-case-against-facebook [https://perma.cc/SS2J3Z2R].
175. Id. at 5:51.
176. See id. at 10:10.
177. See id. at 6:43.
178. Id. at 6:52.
179. The Ezra Klein Show, Antitrust, Censorship, Misinformation, and the 2020 Election, VOX
CONVERSATIONS, at 42:55 (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.radio.com/podcasts/the-ezra-klein-show20555/antitrust-censorship-misinformation-and-the-2020-election-350185251
[https://perma.cc/B5LZ-FPC3].
180. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 113.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 114.
183. See id. at 114–15.
184. Id. at 116.
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with the inexact costs to consumers of anticompetitive behavior by Big Tech, it
is practically impossible to measure the market power required to trigger
antitrust enforcement and evaluation.
According to FTC Commissioner Christine S. Wilson, “Under the consumer
welfare standard, business conduct and mergers are evaluated to determine
whether [the conduct or merger] harm[s] consumers in any relevant market.”185
Numerous cases have followed the view espoused by Judge Bork that Congress
wrote the Sherman Act as a “consumer welfare prescription.”186
However, per Lina Khan, the Chair of the FTC, “Focusing antitrust
exclusively on consumer welfare is a mistake.”187 Congress created the FTC to
prohibit “unfair methods of competition”188 and serve as an “administrative
tribunal” that carefully studies ongoing business practices and economic
conditions.189 To enable the agency to carry out these functions, Congress
assigned the FTC powers to “make rules and regulations for the purpose of
carrying out the [FTC Act’s] provisions,” as well as broad investigative authority
to compel business information and conduct market studies.190 Notably,
Congress established the provision prohibiting “unfair methods of competition”
to reach beyond the other antitrust statutes, “to fill in the gaps in the other
antitrust laws, and to round them out and make their coverage complete.”191
In 2015, the FTC adopted a set of “Enforcement Principles,” stating that the
FTC’s targeting of “unfair methods of competition” would be guided by the
“promotion of consumer welfare.”192 A narrow construction of consumer
185. Christine S. Wilson, Comm’r, FTC, Welfare Standards Underlying Antitrust
Enforcement: What You Measure is What You Get, Keynote Address at George Mason Law
Review 22nd Annual Antitrust Symposium: Antitrust at the Crossroads? 1 (Feb. 15, 2019),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1455663/welfare_standard_speec
h_-_cmr-wilson.pdf [https://perma.cc/EG93-MJJH].
186. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 47; BORK, supra note 58, at 64.
187. Khan, supra note 60, at 743 (citations omitted).
188. S. Rep. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) (“The committee gave careful consideration to the
question as to whether it would attempt to define the many and variable unfair practices which
prevail in commerce and to forbid [them] . . . or whether it would, by a general declaration
condemning unfair practices, leave it to the commission to determine what practices were unfair.
It concluded that the latter course would be better, for the reason . . . that there were too many unfair
practices to define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent
others.”).
189. See Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of “Unfair Methods of Competition” in Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REV. 227, 233 (1980); see also Marc Winerman,
The Origins of the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST
L.J. 1, 78 (2003).
190. 15 U.S.C. § 46.
191. Averitt, supra note 189, at 251 (“Section 5 is not confined to conduct that actually
violates, or that threatens to violate, one of the other antitrust statutes. If it were limited to this
extent it would be a largely duplicative provision. The legislative purpose instead assigned to
Section 5 a broader role. It was to be an interstitial statute; it was to fill in the gaps in the other
antitrust laws, to round them out and make their coverage complete. In addition to overt violations,
therefore, Section 5 would reach closely similar conduct that violates the policy or ‘spirit’ of the
antitrust laws, even though it may not come technically within its terms.”).
192. FTC, Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition”
Under
Section
5
of
the
FTC
Act
(Aug.
13,
2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforceme
nt.pdf [https://perma.cc/PV7D-DFC7].
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welfare as the guiding principle behind U.S. antitrust laws limits the scope of
competitive harms the analysis considers by narrowing the focus to price and
output rather than the competitive process and the inherent downsides of
excessive market concentration.193 Doing so is contrary to Congress’s intent in
passing the antitrust laws “to safeguard against excessive concentrations of
economic power.”194 The antitrust laws’ original intent and broad goals were “to
protect not just consumers, but also workers, entrepreneurs, independent
businesses, open markets, a fair economy, and democratic ideals.”195 The
consumer welfare standard’s narrow focus on price “to the exclusion of other
factors that benefit consumers”196 overlooks the many “other ways that
excessive concentration can harm [consumers and other businesses]—enabling
firms to squeeze suppliers and producers,” mine personal data, and harm
innovation.197 Furthermore, consumer welfare only focuses on the difference
between what consumers “actually pay[]” and what they “would be willing to
pay.”198 In the realm of Big Tech, where the commodities are “free,” the
consumer welfare standard cannot be usefully applied to enforce U.S. antitrust
laws.
Facebook removed two privacy-protected personal social networking options
and, as Part VII of this Comment explains, degraded the user experience when
it acquired Instagram and WhatsApp. Facebook did not start charging users
money when it acquired two emerging rivals and started to chip away at its users’
privacy protections. However, this loss of control over personal data and loss of
alternative options for consumers—that is the cost. That is where the consumer
is harmed and where the welfare should be measured.199
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF BIG TECH ON CONSUMERS
A. THE DECLINE IN BUSINESS FORMATION AND EARLY STARTUPS
Facebook’s acquisition of Instagram both neutralized a threat while also
making it harder for another personal social networking business to reach
scale.200 Given the size of Facebook and its network, new social networks
confront considerable obstacles in attracting enough users to compete with
Facebook.201 Investors avoid investing in startup companies that compete with

193. See Jonathan Sallet, Competitive Edge: Protecting the “Competitive Process”—The
Evolution of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States, WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH:
COMPETITIVE EDGE (Oct. 31, 2018), https://equitablegrowth.org/competitive-edge-protecting-thecompetitive-process-the-evolution-of-antitrust-enforcement-in-the-united-states
[https://perma.cc/NXX7-H8J8].
194. Khan, supra note 60, at 743.
195. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 392 (citations omitted).
196. Wilson, supra note 185, at 5.
197. Khan, supra note 60, at 743.
198. Wilson, supra note 185, at 4.
199. What Next: TBD, supra note 156, at 16:06.
200. FTC, supra note 129.
201. See FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 1–3; see also Press, supra note 140.
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giants like Facebook because of the likelihood of failure.202 It is thought to be
“nearly impossible to overcome the monopoly” of the Big Tech companies.203
In other words, these companies are “innovation kill zone[s].”204
In recent decades, there has been a sharp decline in new business formation
and early-stage startup funding.205 Job creation in the high-technology sector has
likewise slowed considerably.206 In 2000, the job creation rate in the hightechnology sector was approaching 20% year-over-year.207 Within a decade, the
rate had halved to about 10%.208 Even accounting for job losses during the Great
Recession of 2007 to 2009, the dominance of online platforms was at least one
factor that “materially weakened innovation and entrepreneurship in the U.S.
economy.”209 Some venture capitalists, for example, report that they avoid
funding entrepreneurs and other companies that compete directly with dominant
firms in the digital economy.210 In the wake of an acquisition by a Big Tech giant
like Facebook, investments in startups in the same space drop by over 40%, and
deal numbers fall by over 20% in the three years following an acquisition.211
The decline in business formation and early startups has followed hand-inglove with the explosive growth of Facebook and the other Big Tech companies.
Dominant platforms, such as Facebook, enjoy superior bargaining power over
the third parties that depend on their platforms to access users and markets.212
Their bargaining leverage is a form of market power,213 which the dominant
platforms routinely use to protect and expand their dominance. The FTC
uncovered that on April 9, 2012—the day that Facebook publicized its
acquisition of Instagram—Zuckerberg wrote privately to a colleague to celebrate
the acquisition and revealed this monopolistic way of thinking: “I remember
your internal post about how Instagram was our threat and not Google+. You
were basically right. One thing about startups though is you can often acquire

202. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 48 (citation omitted).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Ufuk Akcigit & Sina T. Ates, Knowledge in the Hands of the Best, Not the Rest:
The Decline of US Business Dynamism, VOXEU (July 4, 2019), https://voxeu.org/article/declineus-business-dynamism [https://perma.cc/BYQ9-6E24].
206. JOHN HALTIWANGER, IAN HATHAWAY & JAVIER MIRANDA, DECLINING BUSINESS
DYNAMISM IN THE U.S. HIGH-TECHNOLOGY SECTOR 4 (2014), https://www.kauffman.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/declining_business_dynamism_in_us_high_tech_sector.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3Y5R-C29T].
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 47 (citations omitted).
210. Id. at 48; see also Sai Krishna Kamepalli, Raghuram Rajan & Luigi Zingales, Kill Zone 2
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Rsch.,
Working
Paper
No.
27146,
2021),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w27146 [https://perma.cc/NW2N-AC4V].
211. Kamepalli, supra note 210, at 2, 39.
212. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 390.
213. Aviv Nevo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. for Econ., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Antitrust Div.,
Mergers that Increase Bargaining Leverage, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy
Research
7
(Jan.
22,
2014),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517781/download
[https://perma.cc/UJA8-2ZV2] (“[A]s a matter of economic theory and case law bargaining
leverage is a source of market power . . . .”).
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them.”214 Had Facebook not been allowed to dominate the market through
acquisitions and mergers, thereby killing innovation and entrepreneurship,
consumers would have more choices for personal social media platforms.
B. THE NOT-SO-FREE COST OF PAYING WITH DATA AND LOSS OF PRIVACY
Traditionally, market power has been defined as the ability to raise prices
without a loss of demand, such as fewer sales or customers.215 However, because
online platforms rarely charge consumers a monetary price, traditional
assessments of market power are more difficult to apply to digital markets.216
Because of the pricing dynamics in the digital economy, the best evidence of
digital platform market power is not prices charged but the degree to which these
platforms erode consumer privacy without prompting a market response.217
A lack of competition can lead to reduced quality in many markets, but “the
loss of quality due to monopolization—and in turn, privacy and data
protection—is even more pronounced in digital markets because product quality
is often the ‘relevant locus of competition.’”218 In the absence of adequate
transparency or real consumer options, “dominant firms may impose terms of
service with weak privacy protections that are designed to restrict consumer
choice, creating a race to the bottom.”219 This can also create a cycle in which
new firms do not offer products with strong privacy protections or do not even
enter into the market.220
[D]ominant platforms have been able to extort an ever-increasing amount
of data from their customers and users, ranging from a user’s personal data
to a business’s trade secrets and proprietary content. In the absence of an
alternative platform, users effectively have no choice but to accede to the
platform’s demands for payment whether in the form of dollars or data.221

214. FTC Complaint, supra note 125, at 5.
215. W. KIP VISCUSI, JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JR. & JOHN M. VERNON, ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 62 (4th ed. 2005).
216. See Howard A. Shelanski, Information, Innovation, and Competition Policy for the
Internet, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1663, 1687 (2013) (“While increased competition, at least on its own,
will not always cause firms to better use or protect customer information, any competitive effects
analysis that misses these two nonprice dimensions of platform market performance will be
incomplete and could be biased toward underenforcement.”).
217. See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Antitrust Div.,
Remarks
for
the
Antitrust
New
Frontiers
Conference
(June
11,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-delivers-remarksantitrust-new-frontiers [https://perma.cc/AEZ8-Y5HE] (“It is well-settled, however, that
competition has price and non-price dimensions.”); Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, When
Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines, 18 YALE J.L. & TECH. 70, 103
(2016).
218. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 54.
219. Id. (citations omitted); Shelanski, supra note 216, at 1691 (“Competition, however, may
drive platforms to adopt and adhere to stronger privacy policies, making it worthwhile for a
platform to advertise such policies to consumers in order to differentiate itself from its
competitors.”).
220. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 55.
221. Id. at 390.
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To make matters worse, Facebook uses this collection of consumer data as a
weapon. “Internal communications by Facebook’s senior executives and
interviews with former employees . . . indicate that Facebook selectively
enforced its platform policies based on whether it perceived other companies as
competitive threats.’”222 “Facebook developed the Facebook Platform to
connect other applications to Facebook’s social graph,” which is the network of
friends and connections you have on Facebook.223 In an interview in 2007,
Zuckerberg described the Facebook Platform’s goals as making “Facebook into
something of an operating system so you can run full applications.”224 Over the
last few years, Facebook has “recognized that access to its social graph provided
other applications with a tool for significant growth.”225 In documents produced
to the U.S. House Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial and
Administrative Law (House Subcommittee), Facebook’s senior executives
realized by 2012 that “apps could use the Facebook Platform to build products
that were competitive with Facebook and ‘siphon [their] users.’”226 “Facebook’s
senior employees agreed that competitive apps used the Facebook Platform to
‘steal [their] engagement’ and ‘could be viewed as replacing Facebook
functionality,’ adding that they planned to raise this concern with Mr.
Zuckerberg.”227 “Recognizing that some social apps had grown too popular and
could compete with Facebook’s family of products, Facebook cut off their
access to Facebook’s social graph.”228 The social graph, along with Facebook’s
integration feature and notification of Facebook friends on Instagram, is how
Instagram became so popular.229 The primary way that Instagram and many
other companies grow is through Facebook data.230 So, if these companies do
not do exactly what Facebook says, they are cut off.231 Once you become “an
essential monopoly,” one that can pick and choose who you will deal with and
discriminate against those who are considered competitors and threats, then

222. Id. at 166.
223. Id.; see also Josh Constine, Facebook Is Done Giving Its Precious Social Graph to
Competitors, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2013, 9:51 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2013/01/24/myprecious-social-graph [https://perma.cc/FW9H-MD4C].
224. David Kirkpatrick, Facebook’s Plan to Hook Up the World, CNNMONEY (May 29, 2007,
5:29
PM),
https://money.cnn.com/2007/05/24/technology/facebook.fortune/
[https://perma.cc/CR4U-4P7R].
225. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 166.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 167.
228. Id. (citing Olivia Solon & Cyrus Farivar, Mark Zuckerberg Leveraged Facebook User
Data to Fight Rivals and Help Friends, Leaked Documents Show, NBC NEWS,
https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/mark-zuckerbergleveraged-facebook-user-datafight-rivals-help-friends-n994706 [https://perma.cc/UL8Z-WE24] (Apr. 18, 2019, 6:51 PM));
Constine, supra note 223; Rachel Kraus, Mark Zuckerberg Gave the Order to Kneecap Vine,
Emails Show, MASHABLE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://mashable.com/article/mark-zuckerberg-helpedthwart-vine [https://perma.cc/KM4L-H25W]; see also Casey Newton, Why Vine Died, VERGE
(Oct. 28, 2016, 12:15 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/10/28/13456208/why-vinediedtwitter-shutdown [https://perma.cc/QA2X-KZEC].
229. What Next: TBD, supra note 156, at 11:03.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 10:52.
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there is a problem.232
VII. CHANGING ANTITRUST
Courts that have adopted the consumer welfare standard have not indicated
that other goals are excluded. This opens the door to changes in how we
approach antitrust and measure anticompetitive and monopolistic activities
among companies. The Supreme Court “has yet to issue a decision that precludes
judges from relying upon non-efficiency arguments”—like data, privacy, and
competition—over efficiency concerns.233
As Lina Khan explains in Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, “Internet platforms
mediate a large and growing share of our commerce and communications. Yet
evidence shows that competition in platform markets is flagging, with sectors
coalescing around one or two giants.”234 By giving the power back to the
consumer, the capitalist market will function as designed. However, giving this
control back to consumers requires courts and Congress to change the current
trajectory of U.S. antitrust laws in the technological arena. Killing your
competitors is not and cannot continue to be a viable business model—
outperforming competitors must be.
A. CURRENT CHANGES IN U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS DIRECTED AT BIG TECH
In response to Big Tech’s continuing growth, President Biden signed an
Executive Order on Promoting Competition in the American Economy on July
9, 2021, that includes seventy-two initiatives.235 The Executive Order “seeks to
ensure small businesses and consumers have access to fair markets.”236 In a
speech on the Order, President Biden stated, “Capitalism without competition
isn’t capitalism; it’s exploitation.”237 President Biden “warned that without
healthy competition, the biggest players can ‘change and charge what they want
and treat you however they want.’”238 President Biden “noted that the past few
decades have threatened . . . competition” and stated that “[f]orty years ago, we
chose the wrong path . . . following the misguided philosophy of people like
Robert Bork and pullback on enforcing laws to promote competition.”239
Additionally, in February 2021, Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota

232. Political Gabfest, The “Breaking Up Facebook” Edition, SLATE, at 29:30 (Dec. 10, 2020,
5:15 PM), https://slate.com/podcasts/political-gabfest/2020/12/facebook-presidential-normsattempted-coup [https://perma.cc/MQU4-KJ4C].
233. GELLHORN ET AL., supra note 16, at 48.
234. Khan, supra note 60, at 802.
235. Stewart, supra note 3; Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/07/09/executive-order-onpromoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/ [https://perma.cc/226D-YCJ7].
236. Leah
Nylen,
Biden
Launches
Assault
on
Monopolies,
POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/07/08/biden-assault-monopolies-498876
[https://perma.cc/CRB6-JD4G] (July 9, 2021, 5:45 PM).
237. Stewart, supra note 3.
238. Id.
239. Nylen, supra note 236.
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introduced a bill to promote and improve antitrust enforcement.240 The
Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act would place the
burden on prospective merging companies to prove that the merger does not
create a risk of lessening competition or creating a monopoly.241 If such a
revolutionary bill were signed into law, antitrust litigation would increase.
However, such an increase is just what antitrust needs. Courts “have become
lenient on antitrust cases in recent decades,” and more aggressive challenges in
the courts are what we need to push back against the monopolies of Big Tech.242
By placing the burden on the merging parties to prove the merger does not create
anticompetitive results rather than on the government to prove it does, we can
vastly change the landscape of U.S. antitrust laws. This bill would also create a
better opportunity for variety in the marketplace. Senator Klobuchar believes
that judges who understand the original antitrust laws and how the laws were
meant to be enforced need to be placed in the judiciary.243 By placing individuals
in the judiciary who understand the legislative intent behind the original U.S.
antitrust bills, we can better safeguard against excessive concentrations of
economic power and protect consumers, “workers, entrepreneurs, independent
businesses, open markets, a fair economy, and democratic ideals.”244
Finally, the U.S. Senate passed a bill on June 2, 2021, to increase fees that
larger merging companies must pay.245 The extra money will go to the FTC and
DOJ so that those agencies are better able to hire more lawyers.246 In a recent
interview, Senator Klobuchar stated that “we cannot take on the biggest
companies the world has ever known with duct tape and band-aids.”247 Thus,
this money will give government agencies bigger budgets to hire more staff to
better combat Big Tech.248 With more funds, the FTC and DOJ can more
effectively live up to their purposes. For instance, the FTC, with a greater arsenal
of qualified attorneys, can better prohibit unfair methods of competition and
serve as an administrative tribunal that carefully studies ongoing business
practices and conditions.249 This bill must next be approved by the House of
Representatives before it can be sent to the White House for President Biden to
sign into law.250
These kinds of sweeping changes are precisely what U.S. antitrust laws need
240. Matthew F. Tilley & David B. Hamilton, Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Act
Proposes Wholesale Changes to U.S. Antitrust Law, NAT’L L. REV. (Feb. 15, 2021),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/competition-and-antirust-law-enforcement-act-proposeswholesale-changes-to-us [https://perma.cc/J2L5-8GF5].
241. Id.
242. Stewart, supra note 3.
243. Lovett or Leave It, Rich Boys and Their Space Toys, CROOKED MEDIA, at 58:41 (July 17,
2021), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P_i1PkE37IE [https://perma.cc/VX2F-YQBQ].
244. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 13, at 392 (citations omitted).
245. Lovett or Leave It, supra note 243, at 51:47.
246. Id. at 52:08.
247. Id. at 52:15.
248. See Diane Bartz, U.S. Senate Passes Bill to Raise Fees on Biggest Mergers, REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/business/us-senate-passes-bill-raise-fees-biggest-mergers-2021-06-09
[https://perma.cc/Y688-5AGE] (June 8, 2021, 8:35 PM).
249. See supra notes 188–189 and accompanying text.
250. Bartz, supra note 248.
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to adequately protect consumers and companies alike. Upon passage of the bill
through the Senate, Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa, the senior Republican on
the Senate Judiciary Committee, said that the current system to stop
anticompetitive practices and mergers is “outdated” and “not getting the job
done.”251 Through changes in legislation and the judiciary—changes that appear
to have at least some bipartisan support—we can better prepare ourselves to
tackle Big Tech and its monopolistic and anticompetitive behavior.
B. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS TO PROTECT AGAINST BIG
TECH
While the current changes in motion will help protect consumers against Big
Tech, there is still much that needs to be revised in U.S. antitrust laws. Our
political leaders must push for antitrust reform. Agencies must deny mergers
that stifle competition and have long-term negative consequences to innovation,
creativity, choice, and data. Companies should no longer be able to own and sell
in the same marketplace. Additionally, citizens should be able to challenge
antitrust violations more easily, and those found in violation of U.S. antitrust
laws should face civil penalties.
Congress and the courts must focus on the market structure in dealing with
Big Tech in U.S. antitrust laws. By changing how we look at anticompetitive
behavior, monopolies, and the consumer welfare standard, we can protect
emerging businesses and change the quality of technology and goods available
to consumers. The market only works as designed when companies respond to
consumer demands. But when the market goes unchecked by the agencies that
are meant to keep it operating within this framework, companies have no
incentive to listen to consumers. After all, it’s not like consumers have the option
to use another platform—all viable alternatives have already been acquired.
We must require that Big Tech share data between platforms to allow up-andcoming businesses to work off existing frameworks, much like Instagram did
with Facebook before Facebook neutered Instagram as a growing competitive
threat through acquisition. Thus, rather than forcing startups to bend at every
one of Facebook’s demands, an interoperability requirement would force
Facebook to share information across platforms. This kind of change would
allow new companies to compete with Big Tech rather than just be competitive
enough to be acquired by a Big Tech monopolist.
Additionally, we must require more privacy protection for user data or give
startups the ability, through an interoperability platform, to work off the existing
infrastructure to build a competitive and enticing, privacy-protected alternative
to the existing Big Tech giants. Consumers should have more control over their
privacy and data. To have more control, consumers need more options. To have
more options, U.S. antitrust laws and courts need to adjust how they measure
consumer welfare. To change how they measure consumer welfare, they must
look outside of fiscal cost alone and move toward considering data, privacy,
creativity, and innovation costs. By creating and interpreting U.S. antitrust laws
251. Id.
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with an eye toward opportunity, we can create a platform for small businesses
to grow while also giving Big Tech an incentive to stay innovative and
competitive rather than simply buying up emerging rivals. Such a change will
further promote and encourage investment in startup companies. In digital
markets where consumers do not pay an upfront monetary price, U.S. antitrust
enforcement must shift its focus. By laying down new laws and regulations that
protect consumers, we can stop Big Tech from acquiring more companies and
pave a path for new companies to compete with Big Tech, thereby providing
more options for consumers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The continuing domination of the Chicago School of thought and its focus on
the consumer welfare standard has resulted in higher prices and markups,
monopolies going unchecked, and data being freely collected and distributed.252
Consumers hand over data and attention in exchange for the “free” services
offered by Big Tech. The consumer welfare standard’s narrow focus on price
“to the exclusion of other factors that benefit consumers” 253 overlooks the many
“ways that excessive concentration can harm” consumers and businesses
alike.254
As this Comment has illustrated, current U.S. antitrust laws do not adequately
regulate Big Tech or anticompetitive and monopolistic behavior in the
technological arena. It is time for U.S. antitrust laws to be revised and interpreted
to better incorporate technological advances and businesses of the twenty-first
century. The antitrust statutes were created to invite refinement applicable for
the time.255 Technology is here to stay, and if we want to see what it is capable
of, we have to promote and protect innovation by refining U.S. antitrust laws
already on the books and creating new laws that better protect against Big Tech.
As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
“The challenge for an antitrust court lies in stating a general rule for
distinguishing between exclusionary acts, which reduce social welfare, and
competitive acts, which increase it.”256 Competitive acts increase social welfare.
As this Comment has explained, Big Tech, specifically Facebook, is not
increasing social welfare but is instead reducing it. The pending lawsuits
discussed in Part III of this Comment have the power to set the tone and
precedent for how the United States will manage anticompetitive and
monopolistic behavior in the coming years. President Biden’s Executive Order
and the Competition and Antitrust Law Enforcement Reform Act have the
potential to boost the government’s ability to combat Big Tech adequately.
Along with additional changes, such movements set the stage for promoting
competitive acts and thereby increasing rather than reducing social welfare.
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Much like Microsoft set the stage for Big Tech’s explosive growth, legislative,
judicial, administrative, and enforcement changes in the next few years can set
the stage for future technological innovations.

